Russia’s war against Ukraine is not only about Ukraine’s freedom and survival, but also about the future of Europe’s hard security. Russia wants to replace the cooperative, democratic security order in Europe, the principles of which were outlined 50 years ago in the Helsinki Final Act, with one where might makes right and Russia is an empire dominating large swathes of Europe. This would pose an existential security threat to the European Union and its member states.
The EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine is a geostrategic investment that could strengthen the European security order and prevent Russia from achieving its ambitions. It does so not only by defending Ukraine’s sovereign right to pursue a European path, but also by securing military capabilities and strategic resources for the EU. However, even though Ukraine could contribute to the EU’s security in the long term as a full member, it is primarily Europe that must ensure Ukraine’s security.
NATO membership remains Ukraine’s goal — it is enshrined in the constitution and supported by a clear majority of Ukrainian citizens. However, there is currently no consensus within NATO on extending an invitation to Ukraine. This could change quickly, and European countries are right to insist that Ukrainian NATO membership would be the best and cheapest option for ensuring security in the North Atlantic area.
Nonetheless, the prospects for Ukrainian NATO membership remain distant, so the EU must seriously consider how it can secure its geostrategic investment — an EU eastward enlargement — without security guarantees under NATO’s Article 5.
The EU may also face fundamentally new and urgent military challenges in light of U.S. President Donald Trump’s expressed ambition to reach a ceasefire deal in Russia’s war. While the form of such a deal and the prospects for reaching it are far from certain, any form of ceasefire settlement would need to be followed by credible security assurances to Ukraine. Without this, Ukraine would be defenseless against renewed Russian aggression (as happened after the conclusion of the Minsk agreements).
The possibility that EU member states and countries like the U.K. and Norway would have to deploy troops on Ukrainian territory in the case of a ceasefire deal cannot be ruled out. Against this backdrop, the need to step up the EU’s hard security is not a distant task that needs to be realized only after Ukraine joins the EU.
To secure an eastward EU enlargement and address potentially immediate military challenges, the EU must deliver on its ambition to become a geostrategic actor, both on its own and in close cooperation with NATO. It must show, through deeds, that it has both the political resolve and the capabilities to defend itself and its core interests.
Some of the measures needed to achieve that ambition will require deviations from the status quo and reassessments of the EU’s role. The feasibility of implementing the required steps to ensure the EU’s hard security will not only stem from political desire in European capitals, but also from external circumstances and pressure from the U.S. These factors may provide the sense of necessity that, as in the past, enables EU member states to unite, shape, and reshape European cooperation.
First, European policymakers should consider implementing key institutional reforms in foreign and security policy. Currently, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains intergovernmental; since decisions require consensus among member states, EU action can suffer from a lack of timeliness and effectiveness.
A move to qualified majority voting (QMV) in the CFSP would enhance the EU’s policymaking efficiency and could arguably be done without a Treaty change. QMV has been discussed in the past, but today’s geopolitical challenges could provide the impetus to move ahead with it.
The CFSP is also an area that Ukraine and Moldova could be integrated into immediately, for example, by allowing them to participate in key CFSP decision-making forums and by integrating them into EU security initiatives such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
Second, the EU’s enhanced geostrategic role will require large-scale investments and efforts in security and defense. Defense spending in member states would need to exceed at least 3% of GDP, a significant portion of which would be devoted to military assistance to Ukraine and investments in the Ukrainian defense industry.
The European Council conclusions on European defense from March 6 welcomed the European Commission’s plans to facilitate increased national defense spending and provide member states with defense loans. They also called on the European Investment Bank (EIB) to adapt its lending practices to the defense industry, re-evaluate the list of excluded activities and increase the volume of available funding. These conclusions outline necessary steps in the right direction.
Taking on EU common debt through defense bonds could also offer financial firepower for closing capability gaps and strengthening Europe’s defense infrastructure. For such a step to be viable, countries that have traditionally opposed joint debt would need to change their frugal positions.
Third, if the EU is to succeed in taking on a new role in world politics, European leaders must improve their strategic communication with citizens. A change in strategic culture in Europe — based on an understanding among citizens of, for example, why enlargement is a geostrategic investment, why enlargement needs security, and the urgent military challenges the EU might face — will be key to ensuring domestic support for investments in security and defense.
Strategic communication with the citizens of EU member states about the concrete contributions that candidate countries can make to the EU’s security and economic prosperity as full member states will also play an important role.
Fourth, greater and closer cooperation between the EU and NATO will be necessary to ensure effective complementarity and intelligence sharing between the two organizations. One step could be sealing a new partnership between the EU and NATO, under which the EU would use its financial and regulatory tools to help member states fulfill NATO capability requirements and enforce more strictly defined NATO standardization agreements for equipment and ammunition to enhance interoperability.
Trilateral exchanges between the EU, NATO, and groups of EU member states on creating military mobility corridors and consolidating multinational military logistics would further strengthen cooperation and could be proactively suggested to the U.S. by European states.
Fifth, bearing in mind the possibility of a military operation on Ukrainian territory, European states should ensure they create the structures necessary for its implementation. There is a need to establish a joint military command, along with various staff structures, responsible for planning both the operation itself and potential reinforcements for deployed troops in the event of a crisis.
Additionally, logistics and intelligence structures will need to be set up, and the military units that could participate must be identified. Ideally, these would be multinational formations already established within the framework of NATO’s joint command in Europe, such as the Multinational Corps Northeast.
The question of possible independent military operations by European NATO members, without the participation of the U.S., has arisen several times in NATO’s history. These ideas have traditionally been rejected by Washington, partly because of concerns that an increasingly autonomous Europe would undermine U.S. authority in NATO, duplicate NATO resources, and threaten NATO cohesion.
If Washington is shifting its approach to Europe's security, now may be the right time to revisit the idea of establishing European cells within NATO. This would allow Europe to take on the primary responsibility for ensuring Ukraine’s (and Europe’s) security, while maintaining critical U.S. support within NATO for logistics, airlift, and strategic reconnaissance.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent. The article summarizes the results of a longer SCEEUS report, linked here.
David Junk
