On March 7, tens of thousands of people took to the streets across Slovakia for the third time this year to protest the pro-Russian policies of Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government. They voiced concerns that Slovakia is drifting away from the European Union and its transatlantic allies.
Their fears are well-founded. Since autumn 2023, a coalition of nationalist, EU-skeptic, and pro-Russian parties has held power in Bratislava. While Fico’s left-wing Smer party pushes pro-Russian rhetoric, the Slovak National Party (SNS) promotes a “pan-Slavic brotherhood” with Moscow. The result is the same: under Fico, Slovakia is moving in a direction similar to Viktor Orbán’s Hungary.
Fico’s government has demonstrated a clear alignment with Moscow. In September 2024, he falsely claimed that Nazi troops were fighting in Ukraine. He was also the first prime minister of an EU member state to grant an interview to the Russian state television channel Rossiya 1.
In October 2024, Ľuboš Blaha, a European Parliament member of Fico’s Smer, traveled to Moscow to “apologize to the Russians for EU sanctions,” provocatively stating, “fascism and war come from the West, while freedom and peace come from the East.”
Fico met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in December 2024, and he had already accepted Putin’s invitation to travel to Moscow in May 2025. In January 2025, a delegation from SNS also visited Moscow, where party chairman Andrej Danko called Putin “a very reasonable and pragmatic leader.”
Concerned about the government’s pro-Russian stance, the liberal opposition party Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) proposed enshrining Slovakia’s EU membership in the constitution. The response from Fico’s camp was both surprising and alarming: Tibor Gašpar, a former police chief indicted for criminal activity and now a Smer politician, suggested that Slovakia should consider leaving the EU if its rules were to change. Even President Peter Pellegrini, from the coalition partner Hlas, distanced himself from Gašpar’s remarks.
While a Slovak exit from the EU may still seem unlikely, many citizens are deeply unsettled by the government’s direction. This frustration has fueled mass protests, where demonstrators wave Ukrainian flags and rally under the slogan “Peace for Ukraine.”
Fico, however, has responded with conspiracy theories. When his government faced a no-confidence vote in January 2025 — after losing several MPs and potentially its parliamentary majority — he called for a closed session, claiming Slovakia’s intelligence service (led by the son of Tibor Gašpar) had warned him of an attempted coup.
According to Fico, NGOs active in Ukraine and Georgia were plotting to overthrow him — a claim with no evidence, but one that echoed the rhetoric of Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Around the same time, Orbán himself visited Bratislava, further strengthening ties between the two leaders. In the end, Fico managed to block the no-confidence vote, despite his government’s fragile majority.
Fico’s Orbán-like approach extends beyond foreign policy into domestic affairs. Ironically, Fico — who pursued anti-Hungarian minority policies in his first term (2006–2010) — has now become a close ally of Orbán. Even Slovakia’s Hungarian minority party aligns with Fico’s anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian stance.
Like Orbán, Fico has worked to weaken democratic checks and balances — amending criminal law in his interests, restructuring public media to silence critical journalists, and allowing SNS’s nationalist culture minister to wage a political war against artists (theater and museum directors have been dismissed and replaced with loyalists).
Despite these troubling developments, Slovakia under Fico remains freer and more pluralistic than Orbán’s Hungary. The key difference is stability: Orbán has ruled since 2010 with a strong parliamentary majority, whereas Fico’s coalition is fragile and divided. Some MPs from his smaller coalition partners, SNS and Hlas, have already left the government, though they have not yet voted against him.
Fico’s pro-Russian stance has so far been more of a rhetorical tool for domestic politics. Unlike Orbán, he ultimately did not block the EU’s decision on Ukraine in early March, as he hopes the European Union will secure gas supplies for Slovakia.
Fico’s pragmatism can also be explained by the fact that a fully pro-Russian foreign policy and a boycott strategy at the European level would not even be entirely supported within his own coalition — particularly by the Hlas party of President Peter Pellegrini. At the same time, the issue of Ukraine — again in contrast to Hungary — is a key mobilising force for the Slovak opposition. While the Hungarian opposition avoids open and direct confrontation with Orbán on this matter out of opportunism, tens of thousands of people take to the streets in Slovakia to demonstrate in support of Ukraine and against Fico’s pro-Russian policies.
Political instability and mounting public resistance continue to pressure Fico. On the streets of Slovak cities, the Ukrainian flag has become a symbol of pro-European commitment for many. They are not “foreign agents,” as Fico claims, but decent citizens of Slovakia who want to avoid the Orbánization of their country.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.
Eerik Kross
